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When informed that A B and B C, humans and other animals can easily conclude that A C. This remarkable trait of advanced
animals, which allows them tomanipulate knowledge flexibly to infer logical relations, has only recently garnered interest inmainstream
neuroscience. How the brain controls these logical processes remains an unanswered question that has been merely superficially ad-
dressed in neuroimaging and lesion studies, which are unable to identify the underlying neuronal computations. We observed that the
activationpatternof neurons in theprefrontal cortex (PFC)duringpair comparisons in ahighly demanding transitive inference task fully
supports the behavioral performance of the twomonkeys that we tested. Our results indicate that the PFC contributes to the construction
and use of a mental schema to represent premises. This evidence provides a novel framework for understanding the function of various
areas of brain in logic processes and impairments to them in degenerative, traumatic, and psychiatric pathologies.
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Introduction
An inferential process allows individuals to anticipate the result
of a grand slam tennis match, based on the known international
ranks of the players. When premises that are related to the previ-
ous performance of the opponents are available, a conclusion can
be drawn without direct experience.
Transitive inference (TI) has been used in various forms to
study inferential problem-solving and knowledge manipulation
in humans and other animals (Bryant and Trabasso, 1971; Paz-
y-Min˜o et al., 2004; Libben and Titone, 2008; Brunamonti et al.,
2011; Merritt and Terrace, 2011; Mou et al., 2014). In a typical TI
task, participants are first required to learn, by trial and error, the
relationship between multiple premises that share overlapping
elements (e.g., A  B, B  C, C  D, D  E, and E  F in the
series A-B-C-D-E-F). Then, when never-experienced pairs (e.g.,
B vs D) are presented, subjects are asked to select the higher-
ranked item using transitive processes (Merritt and Terrace,
2011; Brunamonti et al., 2014).
Two effects characterize typical performance in the test
phase of TI: the symbolic distance effect (SDE) and the serial
position effect (SPE). SDE corresponds to the linear increase
in performance as a function of the distance between the ranks
of the items that form each pair (e.g., comparing B with E is
easier than comparing B with C). SPE refers to the significant
decline in inferential performance for comparisons that in-
clude the middle items of the series and is also observed for
learned pairs (e.g., CD in the test phase elicits poorer perfor-
mance compared with AB or EF). Together, these behavioral
effects are often proposed as signatures of how knowledge is
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Significance Statement
In cognitive neuroscience, it is unknown how information that leads to inferential deductions are encoded and manipulated at the
neuronal level.Weaddressedthisquestionbyrecordingsingle-unitactivity fromthedorsolateralprefrontal cortexofmonkeys thatwere
performing a transitive inference (TI) task. The TI required one to choose the higher ranked of two items, based on previous, indirect
experience. Our results demonstrated that single-neuron activity supports the construction of an abstract, mental schema of ordered
items in solving the task and that this representation is independent of the reward value that is experienced for the single items. These
findings identify the neural substrates of abstractmental representations that support inferential thinking.
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mentally organized and manipulated to make logical infer-
ences between related facts (Merritt and Terrace, 2011; Gazes
et al., 2012; Zeithamova et al., 2012b). During learning, the
acquired knowledge is hypothesized to be integrated in a spa-
tially oriented mental schema (Merritt and Terrace, 2011;
Zeithamova et al., 2012a; Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013;
Gazes et al., 2014).
At the neural level, it remains unknown how the brain sup-
ports themental schema formation that underlies transitive com-
parisons. The little data that exist have been derived primarily
from lesion and functional brain imaging studies in humans and
animal models (Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997;Waltz et al., 1999;
Acuna et al., 2002; Van der Jeugd et al., 2009; De Vito et al., 2010;
Koscik and Tranel, 2012). These reports have provided informa-
tion on the gross neuroanatomy that is involved in logical rea-
soning and the timing of activation of various areas of the brain
during TI (Goel, 2007; Van Opstal et al., 2008; Wendelken and
Bunge, 2010). However, no study has described the neural com-
putations that underlie this function. Current findings suggest
that several brain areas support TI, including the hippocampus
and prefrontal cortex (PFC; Goel, 2007; Zeithamova et al.,
2012b). Specifically, the PFC appears to manage the mental
schema that is used to extract the conclusion of the inferential
process that is tested (Zeithamova et al., 2012a; Preston and
Eichenbaum, 2013). This evidence has led to the hypothesis that
if the PFC supports the formation and manipulation of a mental
schema, the modulation of neural activity in this area should
parallel the principal behavioral effects that are observed in the TI
task.
To test this hypothesis, we studied the activity of single neu-
rons of the PFC in twomacaquemonkeys that were performing a
TI task (Brunamonti et al., 2014). We found that their response
patterns correlated with the SPE and SDE, suggesting that they
contribute to the neural underpinning of the formation of the
mental schema. Similarly, observing the neuronal modulation
during all pair comparisons, we estimated the shape of the
tuning of the mental representation of the ranked items. The
shape of the tuning curves, which rarely coded for items at
the extremes of the series, suggests a mental schema that is
based on the relative value of items rather than on reward-
driven activation and reinforcement.
Materials andMethods
Subjects. Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), weighing 5.50 kg
(Monkey 1) and 6.50 kg (Monkey 2), were tested on a TI task (Fig. 1A),
based on a ranked series of nonsense stimuli while neural (single unit)
activity was recorded, extracellularly targeting the dorsal portion of the
PFC (dPFC) and using a five-channel multielectrode system (Thomas
Recording). The recording chambers were surgically implanted over the
left frontal lobe at known stereotaxic coordinates (anterior: 32, lateral: 19
in Monkey 1; anterior: 30, lateral: 18 in Monkey 2), with head restraint
devices. The locations of the electrodes in the PFC were confirmed at the
end of the neurophysiological experiments by structural MRI (Monkey
Figure 1. TI task and behavioral performance. A, Time sequence of the task during the learning and test blocks. The gray bars indicate the analysis epochs. Top, Sample of rank-ordered stimuli
at thebeginningof adaily experimental session.B, Schematic of all 15possible combinations of itempairs, labeledas learned (whiteboxes) or novel (filledboxes).C, Averageperformanceonall pairs
during the test phase for both animals in all sessions. The gray region highlights data referring to novel pairs. Error bars are SE.
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2) or visual inspection after surgical opening of the dura during the
implantation of a chronic array (Monkey 1). All surgical procedures were
performed using aseptic techniques under general anesthesia (1–3%
isoflurane-oxygen, to effect).
Animal care, housing, and experimental procedures conformed to
European (Directive 210/63/EU) and Italian (DD.LL. 116/92 and 26/14)
laws on the use of nonhuman primates for scientific research. The re-
search protocol was approved by the Italian Health Ministry (Central
Direction for the Veterinary Service). The housing conditions and exper-
imental procedures were established per the Weatherall report (use of
nonhuman primates in research).
Test stimuli and task design. We constructed a set of 80 stimuli (black
andwhite bitmaps, 16° 16° visual angle), consisting of abstract images.
Each stimulus had the same proportion of white area over a black back-
ground. During each session, the monkeys were required to learn the
relationships between 6 new items, which were selected from the original
set of 80 and randomly rank-ordered by one of the authors (Fig. 1A, top).
The same itemwas never assigned an identical rank between sessions and
was never repeated until sufficient time had passed. The stimuli that
constituted the series were changed daily to avoid providing a simple
solution that was based on symbol familiarity and absolute knowledge
(Guez and Audley, 2013).
Each session comprised two learning phases and a test phase. During
the learning phases, the monkeys had to learn the relationships between
the 6 ranked items; during the test phase, they had to use that knowledge
to solve inference problems. In the initial learning phase, pairs of items
with adjacent ranks (Fig. 1B, learned) were presented sequentially to the
monkey. For each pair, the animal had to identify the rewarded item by
trial and error in blocks of 15 (Monkey 1) or 20 (Monkey 2) trials. We
repeated the block until the percentage of correct responses was at least
90% for the pair. Then, the next pair was presented per the same rules.
Once the animal reached the learning criterion of a 90% correct choice
rate for all pairs, it advanced to the second step of the learning phase,
which involved larger blocks of trials. In this phase, all five previously
experienced pairs were presented in random order. A different learning
criterion (60% correct trials) was used, and additional blocks of trials
were presented until this threshold was reached. A key piece of informa-
tion that was provided to the animals during learning was that an item
(with the exclusion of those at the extremes of the series) had a disparate
value, depending on the itemwithwhich it was simultaneously presented
(e.g., C was always reinforced when presented with D but never when
presented with B).
During the test phase, the monkeys were tested in a block of at least 14
trials for each problem. Both learned pairs and novel pairs were pre-
sented (Fig. 1B), andmonkeys were required to generalize the basic rules.
For novel pairs, the monkeys had to infer the correct response by refer-
ring to the rank order representation of the items that were acquired
during the learning phase (e.g., in the pair BE, concluding that the rein-
forced target is B due to the relationship of B and E with the adjacent C
and D, respectively).
The behavioral task was administered using the Cortex software pack-
age (dally.nimh.nih.gov) to control the visual display on which the stim-
uli were presented and a touchscreen (MicroTouch, sampling rate of 200
Hz) that was connected to a PC by a serial port to detect the choice. An
RX6 TDT system (Tucker-Davis Technologies), synchronized to the be-
havioral events, detected the neural activity during each behavioral trial
and recorded eye position signals. We used the learning time to isolate
single neurons; neural activity was recorded only during the test phase.
Eyemovements weremonitored and recorded using an infrared tracking
system (Arrington Research) at sampling rate of 220 Hz.
The structure of each behavioral trial was identical for the learning and
test phases (Fig. 1A, bottom). The beginning of each trial was signaled
by the appearance of a red spot (13.5° 13.5° visual angle) at the center
of the screen. The monkeys had 5 s to push a button in front of them to
start the task; otherwise, the trial was aborted. Two hundredmilliseconds
after the button was pushed, a pair of items was presented for a variable
epoch (referred to here as delay; Fig. 1A), after which the central red spot
vanished (Go signal), and the monkeys indicated which item of the pair
was higher in rank (target item; i.e., the one that was associated with the
reward) by touching it on the monitor. Each target item of a pair was
randomly presented to the left or right of the central spot. The duration
of the delay in the learning phases was always 0, whereas in the test
phases, it varied randomly between 600 and 1200 ms.
Behavioral and neuronal correlates of SPE and SDE. The SDE and SPE
characterize one’s performance on a TI task. The SDE predicts that per-
formance improves as the difference in the rank of the items that are
compared widens, for example, comparing B and E should be easier than
comparing B and D. The SPE predicts that at a given symbolic distance,
the performance when comparing items with extreme ranks should be
better than comparing items with intermediate ranks.
By one-way Kruskal–Wallis and Fisher least significance difference
(LSD) post hoc comparisons, we examined whether the behavior of the
monkeys reflected the SPE and SDE. To determine whether their behav-
ioral performance increased with rank distance, as predicted by the SDE,
we analyzed the behavioral data by linear regression. Then, we evaluated
whether these behavioral effects were mirrored by neural activity. These
steps enabled us to determine whether performance and neural activity
that was related to the choice of a given target item changed, depending
on the rank of the paired items. The neuronal response properties were
studied during a baseline epoch (200 ms preceding the onset of the
pair of items) and two periods in the decision-making epoch: (1) early
delay, beginning 100 ms from the pair onset and ending 300 ms later,
and (2) late delay, 300 ms preceding the Go signal (Fig. 1A, bottom,
gray lines).
We considered a neuron to have been modulated by the task if its
activity during the early or late delay differed significantly from the base-
line epoch. To determine whether neural activity encoded the SPE, we
performed three-way ANOVA (epoch  serial position  location of
target item on the screen) to compare each neuron’s response to the
presentation of items. Then, we defined a neuron as having been modu-
lated by the serial position factor if a significant main effect of serial
position or a significant interaction between the location of the rewarded
item and serial position was observed (p  0.05). Similarly, three-way
ANOVA (epoch  symbolic distance  location of target item) was
applied to the response of each neuron to examine the relationship with
symbolic distance. Any task-related neuron that showed a significant
main effect of symbolic distance or a significant interaction between
symbolic distance and the location of the rewarded item was classified as
SDE-related (p 0.05). Following this preliminary analysis, the pattern
of responses of both groups, SPE- and SDE-related neurons, was studied
in their preferred spatial location only; i.e., the site that elicited a higher
response to the presentation of the target items (see the following
analysis).
The response of each SPE-related neuron was fit using a second-
degree polynomial function ( y  ax 2  bx  c) to determine the
cell’s tuning preference. Here, we used the sign of the parameter a to
estimate whether the response to middle items was higher than for
extreme items and vice versa. Thus, if the coefficient a was positive,
then the SPE tuning curve was U-shaped; if a was negative, the SPE
tuning curve had an inverted U-shape. A similar analysis was per-
formed for SDE. We used a linear fit to separate neurons with positive
and negative trends.
To evaluate the response patterns of SPE- and SDE-related neurons
across the population, we normalized their activity by calculating the
difference (percentage) between the activity for each pair comparison
and the comparison with maximum activity. To obtain comparable tun-
ing curves across the neural population, the tuning curves of neurons
with negative trends were inverted along the x-axis and aligned to those
of neurons with a positive trend as follows: g(x) f(x) k, where f(x)
is the response of neurons with negative tuning and k is the sum of the
maximum and minimum values of f(x). Positively tuned neurons and
inverted neurons were then grouped. We used one-way Kruskal–Wallis
and Fisher LSD post hoc comparisons to determine whether serial posi-
tion modulated the neural activity. One-way Kruskal–Wallis and linear
regression analysis were used to examine whether the symbolic distance
was significantly reflected in the neural population responses.
By receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis, we determined
whether the neurons could discriminate between comparisons at various
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serial positions and symbolic distances. We reasoned that if a neuron
encoded the SPE, its response tuning for the five serial positions would
follow a U or inverted U-shape, expressing the minimal/maximal re-
sponse for the comparisons for the third serial position (SP3), an
intermediate-intensity response for the second and fourth serial posi-
tions, and the maximum/minimum rates of response for the first and
fifth serial positions. Thus, the difference in response between the third
serial position and the extreme positions should be higher than that
between the third position and the intermediate ones.
For each neuron and preferred spatial location, by ROC analysis, we
computed a measure of accuracy of discrimination between the third
position and the middle and extreme positions in moving windows of
150 ms (step 20 ms), starting 100 ms after the appearance of the pair for
1000 ms. The time at which the neuron crossed the value of 0.65 was the
estimate of time at which it began to discriminate between serial posi-
tions. To compare the accuracy in discriminating between the two con-
ditions across the population of neurons, we aligned the ROC to the
beginning of the discrimination time and performed consecutive rank
sum tests.
A similar approach was used to determine whether the neurons dis-
criminated between symbolic distances. For each neuron, we computed a
measure of discrimination between distances1 with the symbolic dis-
tance of 1 at the corresponding preferred spatial location by ROC analy-
sis. To determine whether the neural activity encoded the symbolic
distance, we assessed if the ROC value increased with the difference be-
tween symbolic distances. Kruskal–Wallis tests were performed over
time after the alignment of the ROC to the beginning of the discrimina-
tion time.
To exclude the influence of eye behavior in the task, we analyzed the
eye position anddirection of the saccades during the task. For each spatial
location of the target items, during the early and late delay epochs, we
quantified the relative times in which the horizontal eye position was on
the target and nontarget stimuli. Then, we calculated the eye position
index (IDX) as follows:
Eye position IDX (position target position nontarget)/
(position target position nontarget).
Similarly, we counted the number of saccades toward the target or non-
target during the delay periods and calculated an index of their distribu-
tion as follows:
Saccade direction IDX (saccade to target saccade to nontarget)/
(saccade to target saccade to nontarget).
For both indices, a positive, negative, or 0 value indicated that the mon-
keys directed their eye (oriented the saccades) primarily at the location of
the target item or in the opposite direction or that they distributed their
eye position (oriented the saccades) with comparable frequencies to both
locations, respectively. We organized the data in agreement with the
main behavioral effects and performed one-way ANOVA to determine
whether their eye behavior differed significantly during the comparisons
of pairs with disparate ranks or symbolic distances.
Finally, for each neuron, we computed the choice probability (Britten et
al., 1996) as the area under the ROC (auROC) of the mean firing rate be-
tween the correct and error trials in the early and late delays, independent of
the serial position or the symbolic distance. One-sample t test was used to
determine whether the average choice probability differed from 0.5 across
neurons.To testwhether the choiceprobabilityof eachneurondiffered from
the chance level, we recalculated the choice probability values by randomly
shuffling the correct and error trials. We repeated this procedure 500 times;
then, we considered the choice probabilities above or below the higher or
lower 2.5 percentile of the distribution of choice probabilities that was cal-
culated by shuffling procedure ( 0.05).
Estimate of value of each item in the learned series from the neural re-
sponse during all pair comparisons. We assumed that the neural activity
that was recorded during each pair comparison would reflect the differ-
ence between the neural representations of the rank of each item of the
pair in the series. Thus, the neural representation of each item was esti-
mated as the solution of a system of simultaneous linear equations (one
for each pair; Fig. 1B). For example, the neural value of B was obtained,
starting from the observation of the neural activity whenBwas compared
with A, C–F. To estimate the unknown coefficients for each of the pos-
sible combinations (for 6 items, 6! 720), we first normalized activities
and then used the least-squares algorithm in MATLAB (backslash “/”
matrix operator; www.mathworks.com). Finally, of the 720 curves, for
each neuron, we selected the curve for which the modeled data (possible
differences) maximized the goodness of fit with the observed data (see
Results for a specific example).
Results
At the end of the learning phases (see Materials and Methods),
the average performance of the monkeys was 66 2% (Monkey
1) and 70  2% (Monkey 2) in selecting the target object in
learned pairs.
Behavioral performance suggests use of a mental schema to
solve the TI task and the absence of a relationship of the
schema with reward history
During the test phase, the performance on novel pairs (including
the so-called critical pairs: BD, BE, CE; i.e., those that do not
include extreme items; Fig. 1C, highlighted region) was well
above chance [Monkey 1: average p(correct) 0.97 (SD: 0.06), t
test: p 0.001;Monkey 2: average p(correct) 0.97 (SD 0.07),
t test: p  0.001]. Overall, the performance on novel pairs was
better than that for learned pairs (one-way Kruskal–Wallis and
post hoc comparisons between symbolic distances 1 and sym-
bolic distance  1; Monkey 1: p  0.05; Monkey 2: p  0.05).
Both monkeys demonstrated an SDE, i.e., their performance im-
proved linearly, following the difference in rank of the compared
items (symbolic distance; Fig. 1C; one-way Kruskal–Wallis and
linear regression analysis; Monkey 1: p  0.001; Monkey 2: p 
0.001). Finally, the performance on comparisons that included
stimuli with intermediate ranks was worse than that for pairs that
were formed by stimuli with extreme ranks (one-way Kruskal–
Wallis and post hoc comparisons: Monkey 1: p 0.05;Monkey 2:
p 0.05), indicating an SPE. These effects demonstrate that the
monkeys could solve the TI task efficiently by learning and ma-
nipulating a new series every day, and that they were potentially
using a mental schema to solve the inferential problems.
We noted that this mental schema was independent of the
reward history of the various items in the learning phase. The
monkeys continued to express the SPE (one-way Kruskal–Wallis
and post hoc comparisons: p 0.05) and SDE (one-way Kruskal–
Wallis and linear regression analysis: p  0.01) and solve novel
problems at a high level when they had to learn sequentially two
separate three-item lists (A B C, and then D E F) that
were later joined by training on a pair of stimuli that linked the 2
lists (C  D; Fig. 2A,B). For instance, the monkeys correctly
chose target B of the critical BE pair (Fig. 2B, inset), despite B and
E being associated with a similar history during learning (Fig.
2A). High performance was evident, starting from the first trial of
the test [Figure 2C; p(correct) for first trials of each session] for
most novel pairs, including those with equal values, as expected
from the associated reward during learning.
In this dataset, we investigated the relationship of the mental
schema with reward history by estimating the value of each item
at the beginning of the test phase from the proportion of positive
feedback responses (rewarded choices) that were received during
learning. In one animal (Monkey 1, 7 sessions), for which we
stored learning behavioral data, we counted the times in which a
given item was selected when it was the winner of a pair and
1226 • J. Neurosci., January 27, 2016 • 36(4):1223–1236 Brunamonti et al. • Neuronal Correlates of Logical Reasoning
divided this value for the total times it was selected, indepen-
dently of the fact that it was the winner or not. For example, the
item B was rewarded if selected when paired with C but not if
paired with A. Therefore, the proportion of reward obtained by
the item B in the pair BC was divided by the times it was selected
in the pair BC plus the times it was selected in the pair AB.
The difference between the estimated values for each item of
the pair was used as a predictor of behavior in each session (e.g.,
performance for BE in test, as B_valueminus E_value), assuming
that the overall performance followed an exponential function:
p(correct)  1/(1  exp [  (rewarded choice 1  rewarded
choice 2)]). The  value for the fitting and the corresponding
residuals were estimated using the “nlinfit” and “nlparci” func-
tions in MATLAB.
Based on this analysis, the estimated values of the rewarded
choice were similar for all items at the end of the learning sessions
(Fig. 2D; each line corresponding to data from one session), and
consequently, in none of the sessions did the value of  differ
significantly from 0 (95% confidence interval residuals; p 
0.05), arguing against the possibility of using the model and ex-
plaining the observed behavior on the basis of the reward history
during learning. The performance during the learning phase,
with percentage of rewarded choices often80% (Fig. 2D), also
suggested that the monkeys adopted a consolidated strategy,
wherein they were able to rapidly individuate the target item in
each presented pair, likely by implementing a “switching rule.”
Analysis of the influence of eye position and saccade direction
on behavior and neural modulation
Figure 3 shows the distribution of eye positions, with the trials
sorted according to the symbolic distance for the target items
when located to the right, of a sample session for Monkey 1
during the test phase. As seen in Figure 3A, the monkey started
the trials by looking to the left or right or at the center of the
working space, corresponding to the central spot or one of the
two peripheral items. Then, once the pair of stimuli appeared,
themonkey beganmoving its eye to explore the stimuli and iden-
tify the target item. However, the statistical tests revealed that the
eye movements were distributed equally between the left and
right positions and that the eye position IDX and saccade direc-
tion IDX did not differ between symbolic distances (Fig. 3A,B
highlights the performance during the early delay). In our analy-
sis of eye behavior in both epochs for all behavioral sessions
(Monkey 1, n 30;Monkey 2, n 32), the saccade direction IDX
and eye position IDX were not significantly affected by the serial
position or symbolic distance of the target item (Tables 1, 2;
one-way ANOVA: p 0.05), suggesting a lack of influence of eye
behavior on the observed neural modulation.
Figure 2. Monkeys’ performance on linked chains of items. A, Schematic of the behavioral sessions with two-chain learning. The learning of each chain included blocks of 20 trials, duringwhich
each pair of items of a chainwas presented (e.g., AB, BC for Chain 1; A–C). Once themonkeys performedwell above chance levels [threshold: p(correct)80%] on each pair, they performed blocks
of 20 trials with the two pairs randomly presented, until their performance in the block reached at least 60% of correct choices. The same procedure was used to learn Chain 2 (D–F). Subsequently,
the monkeys performed 20 trials with the CD pair to link the two chains of items. B, Average performance of both monkeys during the test phase, expressed as a function of SPE (left) and overall
symbolic distance (right). Inset, The average performance for pairs that included the second item (i.e., B) in the series. C, Performance for the first presentation of all pairs in the test phase after
learning the two chains in 11 sessions. D, Percentage of reinforced choices for each item presentation during learning. The extreme items A and F are always and never reinforced when touched,
respectively. Each line indicates the percentage of rewarded choices for the seven learning sessions analyzed. Error bars in B are SE.
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Neurons in the dPFC are modulated by the task and follow
the behavioral effects
We analyzed the neural activity during each trial of the test phase
for all sessions with standard learning procedures (Monkey 1,
n  30; Monkey 2, n  32), focusing on two periods of the
decision-making epoch (early and late delay; see Materials and
Methods). We found that the discharge rate of single neurons in
the dPFC (Fig. 4A) was modulated by the identity and relation-
ship of the pairs that were presented.
Figure 4B shows the mean activity (black dots) and activity
during the first trial (red triangles) for the preferred spatial loca-
tion of a task-related neuron for all possible pair comparisons—
learned (symbolic distance 1) and novel (symbolic distance
1)—during the test phase. The motor output of the monkey was
always directed toward the same location, but movements were
made toward different target stimuli, with disparate (relative)
values as a consequence of the learning phases. A complex inter-
action between the neural representation of the rank position of
each item in the series and the relative value thatwas derived from
the relational comparisons is evident in the figure: (1) the neural
activity is tuned to the learned pairs (Fig. 4B, symbolic distance
1), and (2) for each target item (e.g., B), neural activity also de-
pends on the symbolic distance between (the difference in the
ranks of) items in the pair.
For all neurons, to extract an overall profile of the two main
behavioral effects (SPE and SDE) and thus establish a neuronal
correlate of the mental representation of learned items, we
grouped the comparisons by symbolic distance or serial position
(see Materials andMethods). In the sampled neurons (n 257),
115 cells (45%) were modulated by the behavioral task effects.
This population of task-related neurons was obtained by select-
ing those with a confirmed anatomical location. Neurons that
were located posteriorly to the arcuate sulcus (n 3 fromMon-
key 1, and n 10 from Monkey 2; Fig. 4A) were excluded from
further analyses due to their limited total number.
For the selected neurons, the activity during the early and the
late delay epochs differed significantly from baseline and were
modulated by the SDE and SPE. Specifically, 64/115 (56%) neu-
Figure 3. Eye movement behavior in a sample session of Monkey 1, with the target item always on the right. A, Distribution of horizontal eye positions. Each trial is organized according to the
symbolic distance andaligned to thepair onset. Early delay epoch is highlighted (orange). The value of the saccadedirection IDX for each symbolic distance is reported.B, Distribution of eye positions
throughout the working space during the early delay epoch. The value of the eye position IDX for each symbolic distance is reported.
Table 1. Eye position index for the twomonkeys
Target left Target right
Target ON GO signal Target ON GO signal
Monkey 1 Monkey 2 Monkey 1 Monkey 2 Monkey 1 Monkey 2 Monkey 1 Monkey 2
Serial position
1 0.23 (0.05) 0.12 (0.09) 0.27 (0.06) 0.02 (0.11) 0.06 (0.04) 0.06 (0.07) 0.18 (0.06) 0.01 (0.09)
2 0.29 (0.06) 0.11 (0.08) 0.14 (0.09) 0.07 (0.10) 0.05 (0.06) 0.12 (0.06) 0.29 (0.06) 0.06 (0.10)
3 0.16 (0.05) 0.13 (0.08) 0.20 (0.07) 0.04 (0.10) 0.11 (0.05) 0.13 (0.07) 0.28 (0.06) 0.07 (0.09)
4 0.17 (0.07) 0.04 (0.08) 0.16 (0.08) 0.06 (0.10) 0.14 (0.06) 0.19 (0.06) 0.23 (0.07) 0.06 (0.09)
5 0.12 (0.07) 0.08 (0.10) 0.11 (0.10) 0.10 (0.10) 0.00 (0.07) 0.04 (0.08) 0.07 (0.09) 0.14 (0.09)
F(4,139) 1.19; F(4,140) 2.1; F(4,139) 1.05; F(4,135) 0.79; F(4,138) 2.44; F(4,135) 2.44; F(4,138) 2.44; F(4,131) 2.44;
p 0.32 p 0.39 p 0.08 p 0.53 p 0.53 p 0.20 p 1.55 p 0.87
Symbolic distance
1 0.27 (0.05) 0.10 (0.08) 0.14 (0.06) 0.08 (0.09) 0.16 (0.05) 0.04 (0.06) 0.19 (0.06) 0.01 (0.08)
2 0.28 (0.06) 0.02 (0.11) 0.20 (0.07) 0.06 (0.10) 0.13 (0.05) 0.06 (0.07) 0.24 (0.06) 0.05 (0.07)
3 0.27 (0.05) 0.08 (0.11) 0.19 (0.05) 0.03 (0.10) 0.18 (0.06) 0.15 (0.08) 0.25 (0.05) 0.03 (0.08)
4 0.31 (0.05) 0.06 (0.10) 0.29 (0.08) 0.06 (0.12) 0.11 (0.07) 0.03 (0.06) 0.37 (0.06) 0.02 (0.08)
5 0.19 (0.07) 0.21 (0.12) 0.24 (0.07) 0.20 (0.11) 0.01 (0.06) 0.10 (0.07) 0.25 (0.08) 0.08 (0.10)
F(4,138) 0.67; F(4,149) 0.71; F(4,139) 1.44; F(4,144) 0.47; F(4,139) 0.62; F(4,140) 0.34; F(4,139) 1.29; F(4,145) 0.31;
p 0.61 p 0.58 p 0.22 p 2.43 p 0.65 p 2.44; p 0.35 p 0.87
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rons displayed significant modulation by the SDE, 74/115 (64%)
neuronsweremodulated by the SPE across all symbolic distances,
and 23 (20%) cells were modulated by both the SDE and SPE
(Table 3). Eighty-seven (76%) of the task-related neurons also
showed a significant spatial preference for the presentation of the
target item (significant main effect by three-way ANOVA (p 
0.05) and SPE/SDE  location of target item interaction: p 
0.05; Table 3). Seventy-eight percent (58/74) of SPE-modulated
neurons were modulated in the early and late delays (main effect
of serial position p  0.05), whereas 12% (9/74) neurons were
Table 2. Saccade direction index for the twomonkeys
Target left Target right
Monkey 1 Monkey 2 Monkey 1 Monkey 2
Serial position
1 0.18 (0.06) 0.16 (0.05) 0.19 (0.04) 0.26 (0.07)
2 0.17 (0.06) 0.21 (0.07) 0.28 (0.05) 0.24 (0.08)
3 0.23 (0.08) 0.20 (0.07) 0.17 (0.08) 0.33 (0.08)
4 0.19 (0.07) 0.20 (0.07) 0.25 (0.07) 0.39 (0.08)
5 0.17 (0.10) 0.30 (0.12) 0.25 (0.11) 0.27 (0.11)
F(4,140) 0.10; p 0.98 F(4,140) 0.43; p 0.78 F(4,140) 0.37; p 0.83 F(4,130) 0.51; p 0.72
Symbolic distance
1 0.17 (0.06) 0.20 (0.06) 0.25 (0.07) 0.31 (0.07)
2 0.29 (0.05) 0.17 (0.07) 0.26 (0.05) 0.33 (0.06)
3 0.18 (0.08) 0.19 (0.06) 0.23 (0.06) 0.33 (0.07)
4 0.09 (0.08) 0.23 (0.07) 0.22 (0.08) 0.29 (0.08)
5 0.17 (0.08) 0.21 (0.09) 0.09 (0.07) 0.19 (0.11)
F(4,140) 0.87; p 0.48 F(4,140) 0.09; p 0.98 F(4,135) 1.09; p 0.36 F(4,120) 0.61; p 0.65
Figure 4. Recording area and neural modulation in the test phase. A, Electrode tracks for both animals. AS, Arcuate sulcus; PS, principal sulcus. The relative proportion of SPE- and SDE-related
activity is indicated for each entry point. Entry points located posteriorly to the arcuate sulcus are indicated by black dots only. B, Activity histograms (aligned to the pair onset; vertical bar) for all
comparisons during the test phasewith the target itempresented in the preferred location for a task-related neuron. The average neural activity and the activity during the first trial of the test phase
in the early delay epoch are indicated by black dots and red triangles, respectively. Filled gray squares denote the average neural activity for groups of pairs organized by symbolic distance.
Table 3. Proportion of neuronsmodulated by the task conditions
No. of neurons (%) Epoch
147 (57)
SPE
57 (20)
Spatial position
41 (16)
Epoch SPE
15 (6)
Epoch spatial position 35 (14) SPE spatial position
47 (18)
Interaction 22 (9)
No. of neurons (%) Epoch
163 (63)
SDE
49 (20)
Spatial position
74 (29)
Epoch SDE
12 (5)
Epoch spatial position 49 (19) SDE spatial position
33 (13)
Interaction 12 (5)
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significantly modulated in the early delay
versus 12% (9/74) in the late delay (signif-
icant interaction serial position  epoch
or serial position  epoch  target loca-
tion and post hoc comparisons: p 0.05).
Similar results were obtained for SDE-
modulated neurons: 71% (46/64) neurons
were modulated by the SDE independently
of the epoch of the trial (main effect of sym-
bolic distance position p  0.05), whereas
8% (5/64) expressed the SDE in the early
delay, compared with 16% (10/64) in the
late delay (significant interaction symbolic
distance  epoch or symbolic distance 
epoch target location and post hoc com-
parisons: p 0.05). To remove the effect of
the side of presentation of the target item in
the observed neural modulation, we used
only the preferred response in the following
analyses.
Figure 5 shows the average perfor-
mance and the corresponding neural
modulation for the entire population of
task-related neurons (n 115). As a pop-
ulation, the pattern of activity reflected
the SPE (one-way Kruskal–Wallis and
post hoc comparisons: p 0.01) and SDE
(one-way Kruskal–Wallis and linear re-
gression analysis: p 0.01), mirroring the
behavioral performance of both monkeys
(Kruskal–Wallis and post hoc compari-
sons: p 0.01).
Neural activity discriminates serial positions and symbolic
distances and predicts performance
For all task-related neurons, we performed ROC analysis to com-
pute a measure of accuracy of the discriminability between serial
positions (Fig. 6A) and symbolic distances (Fig. 6B) for target
items in the preferred location (seeMaterials andMethods). Each
plot in Figure 6,A and B, shows data sorted by time of calculation
of the threshold (ROC 0.65) from the presentation of the pair.
Time of discrimination (Fig. 6A,B; average and distribution in
the top portion of each panel) between serial positions (rank-sum
test: p 0.05) and symbolic distances (Kruskal–Wallis: p 0.05)
from pair onset did not differ significantly.
To better quantify the effect, the ROC values of each neuron
that reached the threshold were realigned to the time at which
they occurred and averaged across the population (Fig. 6C).
Based on the statistical tests, the discrimination of extreme serial
positions from the third serial position was significantly more
accurate in the 150–350 ms range from reaching of threshold
(Fig. 6C, left; rank-sum tests p  0.05), and the accuracy of dis-
criminating differences in symbolic distances from distance 1 in
the 150 ms epoch starting from the time of the threshold was
significantly greater (Fig. 6C, right; Kruskal–Wallis: p  0.05).
From the presentation of the pair, the discriminability for the
serial position emerged	400 ms later. Conversely, the discrim-
inability for the symbolic distance was evident at 	300 ms after
presentation of the pair (Fig. 6).
Finally, by choice probability analysis, we evaluated whether
the neural activity during the early and late delay epochs could
predict the performance on the task (error vs correct trials).
Choice probabilities of 0.5 indicate that neural activity is not a
reliable predictor of performance, whereas values that differ sig-
nificantly from 0.5 can predict it.
The distribution of choice probabilities for each dPFC task-
related neuron in both epochs is reported in Figure 7. By statisti-
cal analysis, 7% of neurons had a choice probability that differed
from chance levels in the early delay versus 20% in the late delay.
Across the population, the choice probability in both epochs was
significantly0.5 (t tests: p 0.05).
Support of TI by neural modulation is evident from the first
trial of the test phase
We were aware that after several trials of the test phase, memory
and associative learning effects could prevail and influence be-
havior, even using a novel rank of stimuli each day. Thus, we
included additional controls in our data to ensure that our ani-
mals were able to perform transitively. To this end, we focused on
the first trial of each session. Figure 8A,B shows the normalized
activity of all modulated neurons (bottom plots) and the behav-
ioral performance in the experimental sessions (n 24 forMon-
key 1, n 18 forMonkey 2; top plots) during the first test trial for
each stimulus pair that was presented at the preferred spatial
location.
The mental schema was immediately available, in terms
of behavioral performance and neural modulation. The
monkeys’ performance was above chance levels for never-
experienced transitive pairs (symbolic distances 1; average
proportion of correct responses: Monkey 1 0.82, SD 0.19;
t test, p  0.01; Monkey 2  0.88, SD  0.15; t test, p  0.01)
during the first trial of the test phase, suggesting that they were
making reasoning-driven decisions at that time. Further, from
the first trial onward, the behavioral performance was better
for novel transitive pairs than for learned pairs, perhaps re-
flecting a conflict between existing memories (learned pairs)
Figure 5. Neural and behavioralmodulation for SPE and SDE.Mean and SEM for the performance ofMonkey 1 (top, black lines)
andMonkey 2 (top, red lines) and normalized population neural activity in the early (bottom, black) and late (bottom, gray) delays
for each serial position (left) and symbolic distance (right). A, data related to SPE. B, data related to SDE.
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and new events (transitive pairs) during the test (Preston and
Eichenbaum, 2013). Also, the behavioral performance fol-
lowed the SPE and SDE from the beginning of the test phase
(Fig. 8A,B, top plots;  2 tests: p  0.05), and notably, the
neuronal activity was modulated accordingly (Fig. 8A,B, mid-
dle plots; one-way Kruskal–Wallis tests p  0.01). Thus, our
evidence demonstrates that a unified schema is created during
the learning phase and that neurons are rapidly and directly
involved in supporting the formation of
an integrated representation of stimuli
that are used for transitively solving new
problems.
Next, we tested the hypothesis that
monkeys manipulated the schema from
the beginning of the test by examining the
serial position of learned items (at sym-
bolic distance 1) and the symbolic dis-
tance for item B (at SP2). Even for these
pair comparisons, the SPE and SDE sig-
nificantly modulated the behavior (2
tests: p 0.05) and the related neural ac-
tivity in the early delay (Kruskal–Wallis:
p  0.05). In the late delay, the neural
activity was significantly modulated by
the SPE (Kruskal–Wallis: p  0.05) but
not the SDE (Kruskal–Wallis: p 0.16), despite the activity fol-
lowing a symbolic distance trend. Notably, the performance for
the BD and BE comparisons, not including extreme items, was
above the chance (binomial test p 0.05) level immediately after
learning (Fig. 8C,D), suggesting that the animals were able to
transitively conclude about novel problems rapidly, also using
never-experienced items.
Figure 6. Discriminability analysis for task-modulated neurons. A, Time evolution of accuracy (auROC) in discriminating between middle and extreme items from SP3 aligned to the pair onset
(color plots) and time at which the accuracy value reached 0.65 (starting time of discrimination; top histograms; vertical arrows indicate median values). B, Time evolution of accuracy in
discriminating between symbolic distances (color plots) and the start time of the discrimination (top histograms; vertical arrows indicate median values). C, Average (shaded areas indicate SEM)
value across population aligned at the start of discrimination for serial position (left) and symbolic distance (right). The differences between conditions over time are indicated (horizontal black
segment). Insets, Values obtained using only neurons with significant values. Horizontal bars in C, time of significant difference. *p 0.05.
Figure 7. Distribution of choice probability. Distribution of choice probability across the task-related neurons in the early (left)
and late (right) delays. Dark points indicate values that are significantly different fromchance after permutation. Average values of
the distributions (vertical arrows) were significantly0.5 (t test: p 0.01).
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The shape of the estimated neural representation of the rank
of the items suggests the use of an internal model
To understand the form of the representation of the ranked items
in the brain, we examined the activity of task-modulated neurons
for all pair comparisons during the test phase. The form of this
representation, which can be defined as a “mental schema” (Pres-
ton and Eichenbaum, 2013), is useful for describing the possible
strategy that is adopted by animals when adding information to
behavioral evidence. Because the stimuli were presented only as
pairs, the value/position of each item in the schema could be
derived only mathematically.
Two primary hypotheses have been developed to account for
behavioral outcomes in TI (for review, see Vasconcelos, 2008).
The value transfer hypothesis (von Fersen et al., 1991) empha-
sizes the reward association mechanisms that take place during
the learning phase of the task. At the end of the learning phase, the
always-rewarded item A acquires the maximum value, and the
never-rewarded item F receives the lower value. The interme-
diate items, rewarded 50% of the time, acquire moderate values
that are proportional to their proximity to the two extreme items.
According to this hypothesis, the SPE and SDE emerge from the
comparison between the value (measured as the probability of
obtaining a reward) of each item in a pair, not necessarily due to
the engagement of a reasoning-based process. Our behavioral
control with linked chains (Fig. 2) indicates that this possibility is
unlikely, because we have observed that the SDE and SPE con-
tinue to emerge when two anchor items become intermediate.
The exploration of a mental representation hypothesis (Mer-
ritt and Terrace, 2011; Gazes et al., 2014) opines that during
learning, subjects build a mental schema of the ranked items, in
which items with adjacent ranks are represented as adjacent in-
stances of the schema. Reasoning processes during TI thus follow
this second view, based on the evaluation of the internal repre-
sentation (within the schema) of pairs of items, in which the
difficulty in discriminating depends on how themental represen-
tation is scanned or on the reciprocal proximity of the represen-
tation, which is behaviorally expressed in the SPE and SDE
(Merritt and Terrace, 2011).
These alternative hypotheses generate disparate predictions
about the form of the internal representation that emerges from
themodulation of neural activity during pair comparisons. In the
value transfer hypothesis, the neural activity that is associated
with the representation of the ranked items should be maximal
(orminimal) for itemA andminimal (ormaximal) for item F. In
contrast, if the brain activity encodes a mental schema of the
ranked items, it is reasonable to expect that the list of ranked
items is represented as a tuned response of brain activity, with a
maximum response for 1 of the ranked items and a gradual de-
crease in response as the items that are presented diverge from the
preferred item (U-shaped tuning).
Figure 8. Behavioral performance and neuralmodulation for SPE and SDE in the first test trial.A, Top, Behavioral performance for the first trials of pairs organized according to the serial position
of the target (rewarded) item. Middle, Corresponding neural modulation for task-related neurons. B, Top, Behavioral performance for the first trials of pairs organized according to the symbolic
distance of items forming the pair.Middle, Correspondingneuralmodulation for task-related neurons.C, Top, Behavioral performance for comparisons of adjacent pairs (learned) in the first test trial
and the corresponding neuronal modulation (middle).D, Behavioral (top) and neural modulation (middle) for the symbolic distance for item B. The lower part of the figure shows the pairs used for
data in A and B (lower left) and for data in C and D (lower right).
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Figure 9A shows all 720 estimated representations of the set of
ranked items for the example neuron in Figure 4B, obtainedusing
the least-squares algorithm that has been described in the Mate-
rials and Methods section, starting from the average responses
thatwere observed during each pair comparison in the early delay
epoch (Figs. 5B, black dots, 4B) and assuming that each value was
derived from the difference in values of the single items (e.g.,
observed average activity in BC average activity in target item
B average activity in nontarget itemC). For this neuron, Figure
9A, thick red line, is the bestmodel of the neural representation of
the six items. This estimate is the result of the measure of the
goodness of fit between themodeled activity during the pair com-
parisons, taken as the absolute difference between the estimated
representation of the items of a given pair (e.g., BC  B  C)
and the observed neural response.
Figure 9B represents the best modeled neural activity for all
pair comparisons (empty dots), obtained from the (best) repre-
sentation of the items in Figure 8A. For this neuron, the modeled
response accounted for the observed data, with a goodness of fit
of 0.57. Using this method, we estimated a similar representation
for each of the 115 task-related neurons, always using the tuning
curve that corresponded to the best model. In 99 neurons (86%),
we observed an R-square value that differed from 0 in at least 1
curve, with an average value of 0.4 (Fig. 9C; black bars). In our
analysis of the distribution of tuning curve shapes, they followed
the prediction of the reward association hypothesis (curves peak-
ing at 1 of the extremes) in eight cases. In contrast, most neurons
represented the item’s rank with a U-shaped modulation, with a
maximum for 1 of the intermediate items in the series (Fig. 9D),
suggesting the presence of a neural mental schema. Across the
population, the average estimated neural representation of the
middle items differed significantly from that of the extreme items
(one-way Kruskal–Wallis and post hoc comparisons p 0.01).
Similar results were obtained in the same analysis of the late
delay epoch: 98/115 (85%) had a non-zero R-square value with
an average of 0.4 (SD  0.15). Seven tuning curves had a maxi-
mum at 1 of the extreme items, and across the population, the
average estimated neural representation of the middle items
showed a significant difference between the middle and extreme
items (one-way Kruskal–Wallis and post hoc comparisons p 
0.01). This analysis accounts for 	40% of the variability in the
neuronal data, explaining in part the neural representation of the
item ranks. However, because our main objective was to identify
a neuronal correlate of schemamanipulation, we could only pro-
vide an indirect estimate of it. Other experimental approaches
that use amatch-to-sample paradigmwould bemore appropriate
in generating a measure of the neuronal representation of single
items.
Figure 9. Estimated neural representation of rank order supporting the observed SPE and SDE.A, Estimated neural representations (n 720) of a rank-ordered set of items that couldmodel the
observed neural responses during all pair comparisons inB (observed; black dots). Colored lines are for curveswith R-square 0.1when tested as inB. The thick red curve is for the highest R-square
value in the group. B, Comparison between the observed (black) andmodeled (empty dots; obtained from best fit in A) responses of a neuron during pair comparisons. A measure of the goodness
of fit (R-square) is reported. C, Distribution of R-square values obtained for all task-related neurons. The gray bar indicates the proportion of neurons with R-square0.1. The average R-square is
indicated (black arrow). D, Distribution of the estimated families of curves sorted by frequency of observation. The thickness of the lines and the size of the dots increase with the proportion of the
curve belonging to the same group.
Brunamonti et al. • Neuronal Correlates of Logical Reasoning J. Neurosci., January 27, 2016 • 36(4):1223–1236 • 1233
Overall, these results argue against a reward-based mecha-
nism and instead support TI processes and a unified representa-
tion of the related knowledge. It is likely that the mechanisms of
TI in the dPFC are based on principles that are comparable to
those that have been hypothesized for representing and compar-
ing quantities (Nieder, 2005; Nieder and Dehaene, 2009).
Discussion
Based on our experimental evidence, inferential reasoning is re-
flected in the activity of single neurons in the dPFC, emerging
from the first test trials, and more importantly, the observed
pattern of activation is consistent with the manipulation of a
mental schema that represents rank-ordered items, as suggested
by several studies in humans (for review, see Preston and Eichen-
baum, 2013). The two widely reported behavioral effects that are
observed during TI, the SPE and SDE, are signatures of how
related facts are mentally organized and used during inferential
processes (Zeithamova et al., 2012a). Several pieces of data have
suggested that after related facts are learned, they are organized in
a unified mental representation that is hierarchically organized.
Also, TI problems have been proposed to be solved by comparing
the hierarchy of the represented information (Treichler and Van
Tilburg, 1996; Merrit and Terrace, 2011; Gazes et al., 2012;
Zeithamova et al., 2012a). In our study, these comparison pro-
cesses are well represented by the pattern of activity of dPFC
neurons.
To exclude the effect of associative learning after repeated
presentation of the same problem in the test, we examined the
behavioral correlates and neural modulation, selecting only the
first presentation of each problem for each session. We observed
that on average, neurons maintained their modulation, and
moreover, the modulation was evident for the presentation of
pure transitive pairs (those that did not include items at the ex-
treme positions in the series). We believe that this observation
represents a key new finding of our study. With few exceptions
(Jensen et al., 2013), behavioral studies have rarely tested the
emergence of SDE/SPE during the first trials of transitive prob-
lem solving.
The involvement of the PFC in TI has been documented pri-
marily in brain-damaged patients (Koscik and Tranel, 2012), in
lesion studies onmonkeys and rodents (Dusek and Eichenbaum,
1997; Buckmaster et al., 2004; Van der Jeugd et al., 2009;Devito et
al., 2010), and in neuroimaging studies (Zeithamova et al., 2012a;
Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013). Damage to the PFC impairs the
ability to solve inferential problems, whereas normal problem-
solving performance ismaintained for tasks that are supported by
other cognitive functions (Devito et al., 2010; Koscik and Tranel,
2012). Further, neuroimaging studies have reported that the PFC
is significantly activated during inferential processes but not dur-
ing the acquisition or retrieval of information (Acuna et al., 2002;
Wendelken and Bunge, 2010; Zeithamova et al., 2012b). This
evidence supports the hypothesis that an integrated representa-
tion of ranked items is activated in the PFC during the inferential
process, allowing them to be compared and a decision to bemade
(Nieder, 2005; Van der Jeugd et al., 2009; Zeithamova et al.,
2012a; Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013). Our findings also sup-
port this hypothesis, showing that inferential reasoning is char-
acterized by the activation patterns of single neurons in the PFC,
which is consistent using a mental schema of ranked items from
the very first trial of the test phase.
As an alternative to schemamanipulation, the process of value
transfer from extreme to middle items has been hypothesized to
explain performance during TI (von Fersen et al., 1991; Frank et
al., 2003). Per this model, the value of item A, which is always
rewarded during learning, and the value of item F, which is never
rewarded, are transferred to intermediate items, which are
equally reinforced during learning. To rule out this explanation,
we tested the monkeys after a learning phase with two lists of
items, thereby controlling for the influence of extreme items
(Treichler and Van Tilburg, 1996; Merritt and Terrace, 2011).
Under this learning condition, the SPE and SDE continued to
characterize the monkeys’ behavior, supporting that their infer-
ential process was based on the construction andmanipulation of
a mental schema in which items were rank-ordered. In addition,
on a neuronal level, we determined that a representation of the
ranked items, based on the expectation of the reward, could not
account for the pattern of activity in the neurons during the pair
comparisons.
Evidence of a neural correlate of symbolic distance in the PFC
has recently been reported (Lennert and Martinez-Trujillo,
2011). Twomonkeys were trained for several days in learning the
relationship between a set of motion-dot stimuli that were rank-
ordered by color. Their performance and underlying PFC neural
activity in detecting changes in the motion of random dots were
influenced by the difference in values between the target and
distractor. This symbolic distance effect, again, suggests that the
monkeys were using amental schemamanipulation rather than a
memory retrieval process to solve the task. However, these results
failed to address whether the schema emerged after intensive
training on the ranked objects and whether it could drive the
extraction of information that is not provided directly by the
available hints.
In our study, we demonstrated that mental schemas drive the
acquisition of new information from the beginning of the test
phase; subtend the extraction of new information that is not
directly provided, because the SDE modulates the performance
with novel, never-experienced pairs; and are reflected in the re-
sponse of PFC neurons; finally, we show that tuning of the sym-
bolic distance also emerges for the target that is presented in the
preferred spatial position—not only through the interaction be-
tween target and distractor (Lennert and Martinez-Trujillo,
2011).
In a recent study, inferential processes were reported to
modulate the response of PFC neurons that were associated
with the expectation of the amount of a reward (Pan et al.,
2014). Reward-related PFC neurons modulated their activity
for learned and inferred amounts of a reward that was ass-
ociated with various categories of stimuli. In our study, we
extended these findings by determining which neural mec-
hanisms were responsible for reasoning-driven decision-
making, independent of the reward-modulating properties of
PFC neurons, and studying the neuronal correlates of the sym-
bolic representations that underlie logical reasoning.
These results highlight that the neural mechanisms of tran-
sitive reasoning are comparable to those of the encoding of
physical quantities or numbers (Nieder, 2005; Nieder and De-
haene, 2009). It is likely that disparate populations of neurons
represent the different ranks of the items, which are used as
neural filters to evaluate the differences and compare the
items (Nieder et al., 2002). Notably, the presence of neural
correlates of TI reasoning in the dPFC expands the function of
this region to an even higher-level representation of relational
information, beyond the physical attributes of the stimuli.
Previous studies have shown that the dPFC encodes the rela-
tive metrics of dimensions, such as quantities, numbers, and
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time (Nieder et al., 2002; Walsh, 2003; Genovesio et al., 2014).
For example, neurons in the PFC (Genovesio et al., 2009,
2011) encode relative duration and distance, based on order
and stimulus features. The processing of ordinal distance in
the PFC has also been demonstrated to support the attentional
processes of object selection by filtering out distracter stimuli
(Lennert and Martinez-Trujillo, 2011).
The capacity to reason is a central hallmark of human cog-
nition. Understanding this highly complex ability is a daunt-
ing but compelling challenge. In this study, we used a novel
form of the TI task in which animals were required to experi-
ence a never-practiced series every day. Our results show that
the activity patterns of single neurons in the PFC of monkeys
that were performing a TI task support schema manipulation,
leading to inferential deductions. The specific function of
other brain regions, including the hippocampus (Van Opstal
et al., 2008; De Vito et al., 2010; Wendelken and Bunge, 2010;
Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013), and the relative timing of
their participation in the learning of novel information might
depend on the context and demands of the task (Zeithamova
et al., 2012a; Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013).
These findings increase our understanding of how the brain
works to create abstract thinking and the impairments to rea-
soning in degenerative, traumatic, and psychiatric patholo-
gies. Compared with matched controls, patients who suffer
from schizophrenia or degenerative processes that affect the
PFC, perhaps due to insufficient contribution of the PFC to
the functioning of the hippocampal complex and striatum
(Friston, 1998; Fornito et al., 2011), are unable to solve a TI
task (Titone et al., 2004). Similarly, the administration of sub-
anesthetic doses of ketamine, an NMDA receptor antagonist
that is occasionally used as a pharmacological model of schizo-
phrenia (Fletcher and Honey, 2006), causes monkeys to per-
form poorly on a TI task (Brunamonti et al., 2014). The
combination of pharmacological and neuronal recording
techniques has the potential to guide the development of new
therapies for many types of mental diseases.
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